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Briefing Paper 
NON-DOMESTIC RATING AND THE UNIFORM BUSINESS RATE 
Steve Bailey 
Department of Economics 
Glasgow College 
INTRODUCTION 
The extensively debated community charge (poll 
tax) is only part of a radical reform of the 
financing of local government throughout Britain. 
The Government's intention is to make local 
authorities more accountable to their local 
communities by making (almost) everyone pay (all 
or part of) the poll tax. It is hoped that this 
will encourage high turnouts at local elections of 
voters who wish to constrain "profligate" 
expenditure policies. According to this scenario, 
local accountability will be strengthened since 
very many more of those eligible to vote will pay 
the poll tax whereas only householders pay 
domestic rates. Hence people will no longer be 
able to vote for higher levels of service 
provision whilst avoiding the full financial 
consequences. 
At the time it proposed the poll tax in 1986, the 
Government had also wished to strengthen the 
accountability of local authorities to indigenous 
local businesses. This was seen as necessary 
because over half of total rate income in Britain 
comes from non domestic rates paid by industrial 
and commercial concerns etc. That proportion is 
higher in Scotland (over 60 percent) and within 
individual authorities (up to three quarters). 
Since non domestic rate payers have no vote (and 
consultation is seen as largely ineffective), 
"profligate" local authorities can increase their 
spending by unfairly burdening businesses with 
ever higher rates and yet avoid any adverse 
electoral consequences. Once again, the problem 
is how to strengthen accountability. In effect 
the Government has abandoned the attempt, having 
decided simply to take business rate setting 
powers out of local government responsibility. 
Business will still be required to pay rates. 
This Briefing Paper provides a review of the 
theory and evidence relating to the impact of 
rates on economic activity and a critical 
assessment of the Government's policy response. 
In particular it looks at the implications for 
local businesses and local authorities. Whilst 
the precise impacts will depend on a wide variety 
of measures to cushion the effects of the 
changeover from locally determined to nationally 
set business rates, it can be shown that they 
could be severe in particular localities and 
business sectors. 
ARE RATES GOOD OR BAD FOR BUSINESSES? 
The answer to this question depends on two 
supplementary questions. First, who actually pays 
the tax? Second, how are the tax revenues used? 
The answers are necessarily complex, depending on 
a wide variety of changing factors including the 
degree of competition in the market in which the 
firm operates and the precise mix of public 
expenditures adopted by local authorities. 
(a) Supply side theory 
In the formal or legal sense, rates are paid by 
businesses themselves but in the economic sense 
the final incidence of the tax can be much more 
widely spread. If a firm has some degree of 
market power it may be able to raise the selling 
prices of its products and so pass some or all of 
the tax on to its customers. This is called 
forward shifting and is more likely the greater 
the degree of monopoly power where customers are 
less able to seek alternative suppliers. 
Alternatively the firm may reduce the prices it 
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pays for its inputs of land (i.e. rent), labour 
(i.e. salaries and wages) and capital (i.e. 
interest and dividends). This is called backward 
shifting and is more likely the greater the degree 
of monopsony power, where a firm is the sole or 
main buyer of a particular input, for example a 
particular labour skill. In both cases (monopoly 
and monopsony), market power will be greater the 
more localised the markets for outputs and inputs. 
Localisation is greater, the less tradeable the 
commodity produced by the firm (e.g. a service) 
and the less mobile are its factors of production 
both between occupations and between geographical 
areas. 
It has sometimes been claimed that businesses 
often have enough market power to be able to pass 
on (forwards or backwards) most, if not all, of 
the rate burden so that a problem does not exist. 
Even if this were the case, someone still bears 
the economic burden of the tax and there could 
still be undesirable economic effects. 
Furthermore the Government's concern is not with 
the aggregate national effects of business rates 
but rather with their localised impacts. 
Consider, in isolation, a local authority which 
increases business rate bills. All businesses in 
that authority face an increased tax bill so any 
firm (say a warehouse) knows that it can pass the 
tax forwards (through higher prices) or backwards 
(say by negotiating a lower rent reflecting lower 
profitability) to the same extent as other 
warehouses in the same administrative area. There 
may be short-lived problems caused by fixed term 
contracts for the supply of goods or rent levels 
but, if we assume all firms seek to maximise post 
tax profits, these warehouses will pass on the 
increased tax bill in the medium to longer term. 
Now consider all local authorities, the 
competition between warehouses in different 
authorities and the extent of forward-shifting 
into price. If a local authority levies a higher 
rate bill than other authorities the warehouses in 
that area will only be able to pass on as much of 
the tax in higher prices as is incurred by 
warehouses in other areas. The result is that 
warehousing in the higher rated area becomes less 
profitable. Some firms at the margin of 
profitability may go out of business altogether 
with resulting job losses. Others may decide to 
move into lower-rated areas taking jobs with them. 
Most will stay put since it will cost more to 
relocate than the extra tax paid. However, these 
firms will have less profits either to plough back 
into the business or for distribution as dividends 
to shareholders. Reduced dividends will make it 
harder for firms to raise further external finance 
for investment and there will also be less 
retained profits for reinvestment. Since purchase 
of new plant and machinery usually entails 
increased employment, both in the firm itself 
(labour operatives) and in the other firms 
producing the equipment, then reduced investment 
means less jobs. 
Moreover, new firms seeking a location will be 
more likely to decide not to set up business in 
the higher rated area so that gradually, over 
time, the local authority sees a decline in 
business investment and a loss of jobs. 
Consider now the ability of firms to pass the tax 
backwards into lower input prices. Over time, as 
contracts fall due for renewal, firms may be able 
to renegotiate lower wages, rents etc. Rents 
would tend to be reduced most in higher rated 
areas. Full tax capitalisation would imply that 
users of land and property in high rated areas 
would not be discriminated against. Land owners 
would bear the economic burden of the tax. 
However, if rates cannot be fully passed backwards 
(into lower rents etc) or forwards (into higher 
prices) then assuming nothing changes but business 
rates, relatively high rates lead to decline of 
the local economy and, for that reason, the 
Government believes that business rates are 
unsuitable as a locally variable tax. 
The reader wi11 note that we have concentrated so 
far on profits, investment and output, i.e. one 
that focuses on the supply of goods and services. 
Such a 'supply side' approach underlies all of the 
Government's major economic policies ranging from 
reform of personal income taxation to 
privatisation of hospital cleaning and catering 
services (contracting out). The underlying 
objective is to free constraints on the workings 
of competitive markets so that output and economic 
growth can be maximised. Whilst only one of many 
constraints on supply, locally variable business 
rates are seen by the Government as inhibiting the 
growth of local economies, particularly in 
depressed inner city areas. The inner city local 
authorities are caricatured as high-spending, 
high-taxing bastions of the New Left grass-roots 
socialism, hostile to capitalism and actively 
pursuing a new economic order. Capitalist 
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business is therefore being driven out of inner 
cities by high business rates and unsympathetic 
planning regulations (c.f. Enterprise Zones where, 
amongst other things, business rates and planning 
"red-tape" have been abolished for an experimental 
period). 
(b) Demand side theory 
So far we have said nothing about how tax receipts 
affect the demand for national and local outputs 
from both the public and private sectors (the 
'demand side' approach). Furthermore the analysis 
has been largely partial in that it has focussed 
on business activity per se; it has not been 
concerned with the knock-on implications for the 
distribution of income, interest rates, exchange 
rates etc. which come within the remit of a 
general equilibrium analysis and which ideally is 
required if the overall economic impact of 
business rates is to be assessed. 
If local authorities simply levied a business rate 
and did nothing with the proceeds then the 
foregoing partial analysis would generally be 
valid. But, in fact local authorities use the tax 
revenues to finance public spending. Some of that 
spending will be on services of direct or indirect 
benefit to local firms. For example the local 
economy is dependent on an adequate infrastructure 
(e.g. roads) and on an educated workforce of which 
the private sector would make inadequate 
provision. Furthermore, local authorities make 
direct purchases of supplies and services from 
local firms as well as from those outside the 
area. Hence there is some equity in local 
business taxation and some direct feedback. 
However, the bulk of local spending directly 
benefits local people not local firms and, whilst 
real income levels may be increased by the 
provision of local services, the extra local 
spending (or local multiplier effects) are 
probably quite small. Moreover it is the 
differences in local business rates which give the 
Government greater cause for concern. The extra 
spending created by a high-tax, high-spending 
authority will be spread much wider than the 
administrative area. This is particularly the 
case for the extra spending by individuals 
employed by the local authority in its provision 
of services. They will tend to buy goods produced 
outside their own area (or even outside Britain) 
so that local firms see little if any benefit. 
Hence other local economies benefit at the expense 
of the relatively highly taxed areas. 
One could argue that this doesn't matter. From a 
Keynesian perspective the extra spending benefits 
the economy as a whole. Higher business rates are 
partly financed from savings (retained profits) 
and, since local authorities spend all their 
income, total spending (aggregate demand) rises, 
leading to greater economic prosperity. 
Furthermore, area-specific subsidies could be used 
to offset any localised disadvantage (particularly 
by the payment of rate support grants, urban and 
regional subsidies to firms, etc). 
The present Government denies the Keynesian thesis 
that extra public spending creates (or crowds in) 
extra jobs. Rather, it adopts the Monetarist 
thesis that public spending wholly or largely 
displaces (or crowds out) private spending and 
private sector jobs. This occurs directly (real 
resource crowding out) when the public sector buys 
up unused land, labour, capital and 
entrepreneurship during a recession but does not 
release it during the subsequent recovery. It 
also occurs indirectly (financial crowding out) 
when the public sector outbids the private sector 
for these scarce factors of production through 
inflation ("printing too much money") and/or 
higher interest rates (supposedly a necessary 
consequence of too high a public sector borrowing 
requirement). Both inflation and high interest 
rates are seen as inimical to private investment. 
Inflation inhibits investment by causing 
uncertainty about future profitability and higher 
interest rates increase the cost of borrowing and 
also reduce the present value of future returns 
from investment (i.e. it is assumed to be highly 
interest elastic). 
The reader should, however, beware of seeing as 
synonymous Monetarist and supply side theory on 
the one hand and Keynesian and demand side theory 
on the other. Keynesian theory does accommodate 
partial crowding out effects but these are assumed 
to be limited in a recession and dominated by 
crowding in. Similarly monetarist theory is also 
a theory of nominal demand but, since aggregate 
supply is seen as largely inflexible in the 
shorter term, an increase in nominal demand is 
assumed to lead to higher prices rather than 
higher output. 
So, according to the Monetarist rationale, higher 
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public spending is at the expense of the private 
sector. This is exacerbated by the further 
assumption that it is the private sector that 
generates economic growth, the public sector 
tending towards inefficiency due to lack of 
competitive pressures and the scope for 
improvements in productivity being less than in 
the private sector. This general antipathy 
towards public spending necessarily requires the 
closer control and increased accountability of 
local government spending. The new system of 
local government finance will give central 
government direct control of about 80 percent of 
local authorities' income and eliminate local 
variations in business rate poundages. 
(c) The evidence: 
It is not possible to decide a priori which theory 
is correct. From the Monetarist supply-side 
perspective high and locally variable tax and 
public expenditure packages are particularly 
damaging to the local and national economies. 
From the Keynesian demand-side perspective they 
are particularly beneficial during deflationary 
periods (characterised by high levels of 
unemployment) and any very localised problems can 
be overcome by spatially differentiated government 
subsidies. 
So what evidence is there to assess the impact of 
business rates? The foregoing has made clear that 
the main concern is with the local variability of 
the business rate. Hence aggregative studies are 
of little use in this respect but they do suggest 
that 80 percent or more of the tax is borne by 
reduced profits. This result appears intuitively 
correct in the short term given fixed price 
agreements (for rents, wages and salaries etc) and 
also in the longer term given the competitiveness 
of many markets. Hence it is difficult to pass 
the tax forwards or backwards. Furthermore there 
is also general agreement that firms receive 
little in the way of directly offsetting benefits 
in terms of local authority services. 
All this is to some extent irrelevant because the 
proper comparison is not between business rates 
and no local tax but between business rates and an 
alternative tax that raised the same revenue. 
That comparison would require assumptions about 
the rate and structure of the alternative tax. 
Even if business rates were replaced by 
corporation tax there would have to be some 
changes to the latter in order to raise the same 
combined revenue. The results of the comparison 
would vary according to the assumptions made. 
However, given that the main concern is with the 
local variability of rates it would appear to be 
possible to see if relatively high rate bills were 
associated with relatively low profits and 
investment and relatively high unemployment 
levels. The problem here is that many other 
factors besides business rates affect business 
prosperity in particular locations. For example 
an urban area may have a concentration of 
industries which are experiencing declining 
employment at both a national and a local level. 
Urban areas as a whole have seen a sharp decline 
in the real levels and shares of grant paid to 
them by central government and they have therefore 
tried to make up for the loss of revenue by 
increasing their rate demands. Hence relatively 
high levels of unemployment may become 
statistically associated with relatively high 
business rate bills without there necessarily 
being a direct causation from one to the other. 
Moreover, it is differences in business rate bills 
which create an incentive for mobile economic 
activity to seek the least cost location. Hence, 
once all other factors influencing employment 
levels (industrial structure, urbanisation, 
regional policy etc) have been taken into account, 
the residual employment pattern should be 
correlated against rate bills per square metre of 
floor space. 
Differences in rate bills will have to be 
significant and sustained over a period of years 
to offset costs incurred in moving. The optimal 
time to move will be when any major reinvestment 
in premises and/or plant is required. Existing 
firms may endure relatively high rates for years 
before operations become unprofitable and they 
close down or move elsewhere. Newly emerging 
firms will take into account all business costs 
(of which rates are only a very small proportion) 
in choosing their location so that the impact of 
differences in rates will be muted and take time 
to become apparent. Hence studies using short 
time periods for their analysis will tend to 
underestimate the impact on jobs. Time lags 
cannot be determined a priori and aggregative 
statistical analyses have to experiment with 
varying time lags until the best 'fit' (or 
statistical correlation) occurs between 
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differences in rate bills and differences in 
employment/unemployment. 
A piece of research which attempted to take 
account of structural factors (industrial and 
urban structure in particular) concluded that 
after "one of the most extensive studies of local 
employment change to have been undertaken in 
Britain We are able to detect little if any 
influence of rates on the location of jobs" 
(Crawford et al 1985 p. 92). However this study 
was criticised (by Damania 1986) for ignoring time 
lags, for its neglect of theoretical issues and 
the fact that, in driving businesses out of an 
area, relatively high rate levels may themselves 
influence urban structure. Allowing for urban 
structure would therefore underestimate the impact 
of rates on business location. Other studies had 
been even more neglectful of methodological issues 
leading Bennett and Fearnehough (1987 p.25) to say 
that: 
"One can only express despair at the lack 
of rigour in most of these previous 
analyses and conclude that as yet there 
is little hard evidence to confirm or 
deny the adverse effects of non domestic 
rates on business. In this rather 
unsatisfactory situation there are two 
main ways forward: first, a more 
technically competent econometric 
analysis of short-term and long-term 
incidence of non-domestic rates using 
aggregative data; or second, a micro-
level survey of individual businesses." 
Bennett and Fearnehough (1987) undertake a very 
restricted micro-level survey of firms engaged in 
hand tools manufacture. Because of their close 
similarity in terms of size, production methods, 
capital intensity and product range the authors 
claim a tightly controlled sampling framework. 
One third of these firms are located in Sheffield, 
the remaining two thirds being widely distributed 
throughout Britain. The conclusion is that "the 
paper does provide considerable objective, as well 
as subjective, evidence of major distortions to 
competitiveness and to rates of return to capital 
in one high rated locality" (op cit p.35). 
However, the authors do point out the smallness of 
the industry (approximately 105 firms) the low 
response rate to their survey (29 replies) and the 
caution necessary in generalising from their 
results. 
Their analysis focuses on rate poundages and rate 
bills in total, relative to profits, to other 
production expenses and per employee. The total 
rate bill depends upon rateable value as well as 
rate poundage and it is known that rateable values 
vary widely between different areas so that 
looking at poundages is insufficient. Total rate 
bills will also vary according to the size of 
premises and the equipment they contain and in 
this respect it is therefore misleading to use 
number of employees as an indicator of firm size. 
Employees aren't rateable capital. Furthermore, a 
high proportion of rate bill to profits can 
indicate a high rate bill and/or low profits. 
Profits will tend to be low if productivity per 
employee is low and that depends upon the degree 
of capital intensity and the age of plant and 
machinery (generally, new equipment incorporates 
technological improvements and tends therefore to 
be more efficient). This in turn may be related 
to rate burdens but rates will not necessarily be 
the only influence on capital intensity. A high 
proportion of rates to other production expenses 
may simply reflect backward shifting of rates 
(e.g. high rates causing low rents) and a high 
proportion relative to employees may simply 
reflect a high degree of capitalisation per 
employee and/or the maintenance of largely 
redundant premises and plant which could be 
demolished or disposed of without significantly 
affecting production. 
Bennett and Fearnehough's conclusions are strictly 
only valid for this one industrial sector and not 
necessarily applicable to other business sectors 
where market conditions (particularly the degree 
of competitiveness) vary. Nor does their evidence 
specifically prove that business rates were the 
primary influence on these firms' locational 
decisions. However, given the considerable amount 
of theory and some limited evidence about the 
impact of rates differentials on local employment, 
it would be heroic to claim that differences in 
rate bills had no adverse impact at all. The 
proper question is whether that impact is so 
substantial (and affects so many local 
authorities) that it requires a radical reform of 
local business taxation rather than a few 
temporary ad hoc measures aimed at protecting 
business in particular localities. 
Restructuring business rates - the UBR 
If business rates had been a central (rather than 
a local) government tax the perceived problem 
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would have been resolved long ago. A major reform 
of corporation tax in the mid 1980s caused much 
less controversy than the forthcoming reform of 
business rates, despite the fact that the former 
raises much more tax revenue than the latter. The 
main cause of controversy is not just the local 
variability of business rates but also because 
they are the major source of own-tax revenue to 
local government. 
To abolish them outright would mean either a 
massive increase in the local poll tax (which 
would have to more than double on average) and/or 
a large increase in central government grants 
(increasing by about half on average). Passing 
the whole of the financing burden onto the poll 
tax would be seen as grossly inequitable because 
it is unrelated to income, except within the 
narrow rebate range. It would also be seen as 
applying too strong a financial brake on local 
government services (the poor being unable to bear 
the extra financial burden of increasing local 
expenditures). Passing the whole of the financial 
burden onto central government grants would have 
implications for the levels of other central 
government taxes. 
The Government wishes to avoid both outcomes. 
Since its main concern relates to the local 
variability of business rates (and the supposed 
impact on the growth and prosperity of local 
firms) the solution has been to impose a Uniform 
Business Rate (UBR) throughout England and Wales 
in 1990 and, ultimately, in Scotland. Rateable 
values will be determined as at present (with a 
revaluation in 1990) and the central government 
will set the UBR on an annual basis sufficient to 
constrain increases in yield to the rate of 
inflation. In this way the total real burden on 
businesses will be kept constant with the 
distribution of that burden being redetermined 
periodically at each revaluation (supposedly every 
five years). 
This solution to local business problems creates 
new ones which may be equally as severe. Whilst 
local government as a whole is not being denied 
rate revenue from businesses, the UBR system will 
cause a considerable redistribution of that 
revenue. Local authorities will still be 
responsible for collecting business rates but they 
will then pay the revenue into a national pool. 
Funds will then be redistributed to local 
authorities as a given amount per head of adult 
population sufficient to exhaust the national 
pool. This will tend to disadvantage those 
authorities with relatively high proportions of 
young people (aged 17 or less) in their 
populations which will receive less per head of 
total population than other authorities with 
relatively older populations. In principle it is 
possible to offset this effect through the 
distribution of central government grants. 
However, as part of the radical restructuring of 
the whole system of local government finance, the 
method for assessing the expenditure needs of 
local authorities (and thereby making payments of 
grants) is to be simplified and, by implication, 
made less sensitive to differing needs. 
Furthermore, a population-based distribution of 
UBR revenues will bear little relationship to the 
distribution of local authorities' services to 
local business. 
In setting a standard rate poundage the UBR will 
cause business rate bills to rise in previously 
low rated areas and to fall in previously high 
rated areas. The latter effect may be of benefit 
to the businesses located in inner city areas but 
the former effect will be disadvantageous to firms 
located in rural areas. This redistributional 
effect will also be accompanied by a revaluation 
of rateable values which will generally benefit 
the North of England relative to the South. Given 
that the last English revaluation was in 1973, 
properties in the depressed industrial areas of 
the North are overvalued whilst those in the 
prosperous South are undervalued. This is because 
rateable values still reflect rental levels in 
1973 despite their relative rise in the South and 
fall in the North. The combined effect of 
introducing the UBR simultaneously with a 
revaluation in 1990 will be to cause a massive 
redistribution of rate burdens generally favouring 
businesses in Northern inner city areas and 
disadvantaging those in Southern prosperous outer 
urban areas. In the short term the speed of 
readjustment of rate bills will be dampened by a 
series of safety nets and other mechanisms such 
that the intermediate outcomes cannot be precisely 
determined in advance. Over the longer period, 
however, the final distributive impact will be 
substantial. 
One is prompted to question whether such an 
administratively cumbersome procedure as the UBR 
is really justifiable. Since business rates will 
effectively become an assigned revenue from 
central to local government, there is little real 
distinction between the UBR financed grant and the 
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other grants paid by central government and 
financed from other taxes. In practice central 
government will have the power to vary the real 
level of the UBR in accordance with its priorities 
regarding that tax and the revenue it produces for 
local government. Except for even more 
complicated arrangements giving small businesses 
relief against the UBR, the tax will be unrelated 
to profits and so still a burden on the marginal 
firm on the edge of financial viability. It will 
be a perpetual source of criticism and have little 
real justification for its survival other than 
that business rates have been in existence for a 
very long time. Merging rates with corporation 
tax would take account of ability to pay and 
achieve considerable economies in administration. 
If an assigned revenue was deemed necessary then a 
fixed proportion of corporation tax revenues could 
be turned over to local authorities. 
The problem with this arrangement is that the 
absolute value of that proportion would vary 
reflecting business prosperity linked to the state 
of the economy. Local authorities would need to 
hold large balances in order to overcome such 
fluctuations in their finances possibly lasting 
several years or more. However, the cost of 
guaranteeing an (almost) precise sum from the UBR 
is to make payment of the tax unrelated to 
business profits and so perpetuate one of the 
major disadvantages of business rates. Making UBR 
payments allowable against corporation tax will 
not help those firms simultaneously facing low 
profits and fixed UBR payments. 
The outcome will be largely the same for central 
government finances irrespective of whether the 
assigned revenue is derived from the UBR or from 
corporation tax. The latter would be 
administratively easier, cheaper to operate and 
inherently more justifiable than the former. 
Other than being tidy book keeping, there appears 
little if any rationale for separately identifying 
business rates within total business taxation. 
The cost of such tidyness is the administrative 
machinery required to collect the UBR and the 
regressive tax burden placed on business. 
The Scottish dimension 
There has been an intense debate in Scotland about 
the new systems of business rates and the impact 
on Scottish businesses. The feared scenario is as 
follows: from April 1989 Scottish rate poundages 
are indexed to the rate of inflation. A year 
later the UBR is introduced into England and 
Wales, reducing rate bills in northern England and 
increasing them in the South for the reasons noted 
earlier. Hence the English UBR will reduce rate 
bills in the very area of England most in 
competition with Scotland for the attraction of 
businesses. Meanwhile Scotland gets no such 
relief until harmonisation of the valuation 
process and introduction of a British UBR in 1995 
at the very earliest. The currently higher rate 
bills in Scotland (for business premises 
comparable with those in England) will not only 
remain - they will be greatly exacerbated. 
It has been estimated that the annual rates bill 
for businesses in Northern England will fall by 
about £700 million, although it will be phased in 
over five years or more. In addition the Scottish 
Council for Development and Industry has estimated 
that Scottish businesses would see a reduction of 
£300 million a year in rates liabilities if 
valuation practices were harmonised with those in 
England and Wales and if a revaluation took place 
throughout Britain. 
At present the commercial sector is worst hit. 
Scottish offices, shops hotels and public houses 
pay more than double the rates of equivalent 
premises in England. Scottish manufacturing is 
less adversely affected since it benefits from 
industrial derating (currently 40 percent) which 
roughly brings rates burdens into line with those 
on industrial premises in England. There may be 
some tax capitalisation (e.g. lower rents) 
offsetting part of the higher rate burden. 
Nonetheless there will be an increased incentive 
for mobile private sector jobs in offices etc., 
not to locate in Scotland and this at a time when 
the service sector is seen as the main source of 
new jobs and economic growth. Efforts to 
encourage firms to locate in Scotland could easily 
be frustrated if business rates are a significant 
influence on firms' Ideational decisions. 
Within Scotland itself, the eventual introduction 
of a UBR would tend to benefit businesses in 
currently highly rated areas particularly 
Strathclyde, Lothian, Shetland, Dundee and 
Stirling. Businesses in relatively low rated 
areas such as Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, 
Grampian and Orkney would tend to pay more in 
business rates. The actual outcome depends 
primarily on the relationship between the average 
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business rate poundage in Scotland and the UBR in 
England and Wales at the time of full 
harmonisation. If the Scottish average rate is 
substantially greater than the UBR south of the 
border then most Scottish businesses will gain, 
those in Strathclyde etc., gaining much more than 
those in Borders etc. If the Scottish average 
rate and the UBR are close together fewer areas 
will gain. The precise outcome for individual 
Scottish businesses will also depend on the 
changes in valuation practices and whether 
Scotland's move close to England's or vice versa. 
Freezing real rate poundages until harmonisation 
in 1995 will effectively prolong any adverse 
impact of high rate bills on firms' locational 
decisions. Moreover those bills will have been 
artificially inflated by any grant penalties 
incurred by local authorities because of 
"excessive" expenditures. Businesses in such 
authorities will therefore have to bear an extra 
rate burden until 1995. This is manifestly unfair 
since, having no vote, business ratepayers are not 
responsible for such excess spending. 
Conclusions 
One could perhaps accept the Governments' case 
that business rates are inappropriate as a locally 
variable tax because of the supposed impact on 
jobs etc. However, it is much more difficult to 
see how a national UBR overcomes the problem of 
lack of accountability between local authorities 
and businesses within their administrative areas. 
At best, the UBR means that local authorities will 
not be able to 'burden shift' between voting 
domestic rate/poll tax payers and non-voting rate 
paying firms. At worst the UBR completely severs 
the link between local business and local 
government. Local authorities will simply be 
collecting agents, passing UBR revenues onto 
central government. Nor will the UBR solve the 
problems caused by the lack of a relationship 
between profitability and liability for rates. 
Complaints from financially hard-pressed firms, 
facing fixed UBR payments, will continue. 
The rational solution would be to scrap business 
rates and continue to tax firms in other ways 
(corporation tax, value added tax etc). 
Alternative proposals have included a local 
profits tax on firms but this would cause the same 
problems for firms' locational decisions as a 
locally variable business rate. The only way of 
re-establishing a truly accountable relationship 
between local authorities and indigenous 
businesses is to charge them directly for services 
rendered specifically to businesses. In this way 
they will see what they are getting for what they 
are paying. National business taxes can continue 
to be used to finance local services which benefit 
businesses indirectly (roads, education etc). 
This approach would be consistent with a supply-
side philosophy and where local authority trade 
refuse and other business related services are 
increasingly being contracted out after 
competitive tendering. 
The one outstanding problem created by abolition 
of business rates would be the clear acceptance 
that the poll tax is the only source of own tax 
income for local government. At present the 
Government claims that the UBR is a local tax 
because it is based on local property values. In 
fact it is an assigned revenue. Abolishing the 
UBR would highlight the need for another truly 
independent local tax based on property or 
personal incomes. This is the real reason that 
the Government has failed to follow the logical 
consequences of its own arguments which require 
business rates, to be abolished. 
If (as is most likely) the UBR is retained, it 
cannot be taken for granted that the problems of 
local business taxation are finally resolved. 
There will be a continuing need for research to 
see precisely what is happening. It will be 
necessary to monitor the impact on rate bills of 
the various ad hoc transitional arrangements 
implemented separately for England and Wales and 
Scotland. Changes in valuation practices during 
the harmonisation exercise should also be 
monitored since they could affect particular types 
of business property in unforseen and perverse 
ways. 
The interaction of the poll tax and UBR should 
also be investigated. For example a quarter of 
small businesses are run from the home and the 
fine detail of valuation could penalise them by 
requiring payment of both the poll tax and the UBR 
(on that part of the home assigned to business 
uses). Such an outcome would be perverse and 
contrary to current policy which allows an offset 
of business rates against domestic rates where 
part of the home is used for business purposes. 
This will not occur under the new system since the 
poll tax/community charge (which is to replace 
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domestic rates) is not a property tax and so no 
relief will be given against it for the UBR. Such 
'double taxation' of these emergent small firms 
would hardly seem desirable and so research is 
required to assess the extent of the problem and 
the effectiveness of any measures introduced to 
deal with it. 
As a local tax, the UBR is a sham. Worse still 
the Government has failed to deliver its promise 
to relieve the rate burden on business. The UBR 
is unnecessarily complicated and expensive window 
dressing. It achieves little more than the 
increased subjugation of local to central 
government and a sharp spatial redistribution of 
the burden of business taxation. However, this 
could benefit Scotland quite substantially in the 
long run. 
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